Muawiya's claim to caliphate was due to his lust for power, status and personal gain. Discuss.

The conflict by dint of disclose Ali?s reign among himself and Muawiya was purportedly ascribable to his reluctance and decision non to find and visit Uthman?s killers, and thus regarded as an indirect accomplice in the murder. This seemed to be sufficient causation for Muawiya not to pay homage to him, as it was his indebtedness as an Arab chieftain to avenge Uthman?s finish . til now, historians such(prenominal) as Kennedy, tend to agree with the Shia view, ?treating this guide as a frail pretext for his actions.? The Shia especially tends to get down and humiliate Muawiya, vilifying him for his op horizon to Ali out of sheer lecherousness for agent and posture . thus far Shia and Sunni historians tend to be biased on their views of Muawiya, thus diminishes their dependableness and proper judgement on his geek and rule. Sources and historic fellowship on his life and c beer are actually precisely and of his inner motives and purposes we know even less. co mmon consensus among historians, although a simple one, states that the master(prenominal) reason behind Muawiya?s rebellion once mo reliever Ali was retri yetion for Uthman. While it may be comprehend as skillful that, only a few defecate managed to delve deeper into the implicit in(p) reasons behind Muawiya?s actions. round traditionists such as al-Jurjani, Baladhuri and Awana deem a totally different outlook, eliminating Muawiya and economiseing that Amr b. al-As was the one who initiated and organized the fermenting and combats against Ali in Syria. Amr was a cheat political genius, who was as good as behind the arbitration that deposed Ali, and thus possible that he was the brains behind Muawiya. Other views re-examine the revolt against Uthman. some(prenominal) reports impeach Muawiya of percept the imminent catastrophe and exploiting it for his own self-serving ends and ?began scheming and coveted Uthman?s killing so as to succeed him as caliph? while oppositewises showed him in a favourable ! sporting ? removeing he came to Uthman?s appeals as short as he solidised how serious the situation was only was however too ripe. jibe to Madelung, ?Uthman had meant footling to him; he had through nothing to aid him and mat no personal liability to search revenge.? From this evidence and Muawiya?s deliberate delay for Uthman?s appeals for help, it is thus conflicting with his reason for opposing Ali - blood vengeance; this was in fact a great ?political good? for his own secular ambitions and just a way to meet his Umayyad kinsmen who look to him for leadership and to vitiate alienation. This claim is further back up since his launch for vengeance in Syria was only by and by the conflict of the Camel, sise months or more later Uthman?s murder. coincidently after the first civil war, which further stained Ali?s number as caliph, Muawiya needed that a Shura be set up for the purpose of nominating an untarnished caliph. If he was so keen to test revenge, w hy did he wait that long? Instead, the difficult prospect he was in had spurred him into action. Ali had dismissed most of the provincial governors constitute by his predecessor to reward his behaveers for their services however, Muawiya on the other hand had built a strong local business leader base in Syria and ref utilise ?to be dismissed with ease or to stand by and see Uthman?s work undone.? at one time Ali?s presence in Iraq and Qays b. Sads wobbly control of Egypt expose him and Syria to potential attack from two fronts. eve if Muawiya had accepted the nemesis of allegiance to Ali, Ali would have certainly used his authority to contract him from his position as governor of Syria; so might as well not give his allegiance and use the demand for blood vengeance as a tool to berate rebellion against Ali and secure his herstwhile(a) on Syria. Thus he stepped up his propaganda against Ali and hoped to draw the governor of Egypt to his side, by threats and promises. His endeavor to carry on in great superpower al! ternatively then genuinely desire revenge for Uthman reflects his egocentric character and his unlawful tactics against Ali swear his position as one of personal gain. Keeping to that point, ?It has been suggested that the competitor amidst Ali and Muawiya entailed some compass point of territorial competition between Iraq and Syria.? This suggestion was supported by Hitti, stating ?The issue however, was more than a personal one; it transcended unmarried and even family affairs. The real incredulity was whether Kufa or Damascus, Iraq or Syria, should be supreme in Islamic affairs.? A victory for Muawiya?s army would mean Syrian domination over the rest of the empire, supporting his claim for caliphate and again another example of his lust for power. Some historians state the real aim of Muawiyah was to create difficulties in the way of Ali in exhibition to pave the way for the transferee of power to the Umayyads. The conflict between Ali and Muawiyah was really the rec urrence of the old rivalry between the Hashimites and the Umayyads, who ?believed that the caliphate had through Uthman be occur ?their property?.? yet this aim was unlikely the main reason of conflict but alternatively served as an bonus for the members of each clan to fight. once again power always seems to be the motive; the new Arab civilisation the Prophet had strived for is gradually retroversion back to their old Bedouin ways. other reason for Muawiya?s resistivity against Ali was the effects it would have if he had paid allegiance. As stated by Humphreys: ?the acknowledgment that Ali had come to power in a secureful manner, that there were no other legitimate claimants for the station of caliph?? Muawiya could not return for these effects to take hairdo, as he will a great deal lose all his power and status. In fact, Ali?s designation to caliph lacked legitimacy. Although his close family relationship with the Prophet and merits for Islam seemed enough for his claim, ?He was not chosen by a Shura, which Umar ! had stipulated as a condition for valid succession.? but doubts surround whether his attitude towards Uthman?s murder permit him to fill the caliphate. Despite that, throughout the attempt of the Camel and the Battle of Siffin, Muawiya had ?make no claims of his own? until later on, concentrating inaugural on his position as governor of Syria and waiting until Ali compromised himself by his conduct before interfere in the course of events . Muawiya had no claim or the support needed to aspire for the caliphate and his status as a late and ?convenient? convert without primeval merit in Islam did not help him. The disintegration of Ali?s caliphate was then ascribed to ?Kharijite opposition quite a to his activities, which was sacredly unlawful? although he was the one who started the chain reaction which led to these events. His vengeance for Uthman and determination to go along his governorship led to the Battle of Siffin, which led to the arbitration, which worn outen ed Ali?s position and then Muawiya ?openly asserted his claims to the caliphate.? All the right pieces had suitably fell into place to strengthen his claim to the caliphate and kudos has to be given to him for his political shrewdness, moderation and self-control. There is little historic evidence to subsume Muawiya with the deaths of Hassan and Husayn. Although Muawiya had made a pecuniary agreement with Hassan not to claim his caliphate, people today, mainly Shia, understood implicate him with his death, claiming that he was ? possibly poisonous substanceed because of some harem intrigue.? Some early Arab historians believe that Muawiya made many plans and arrangements to kill Hassan . It was state that he secretly contacted Hassan?s wife Ja?da bint al-Ash?arh ibn Qays and instigated her to poison her husband, promising gold and mating to Yazid in return . However it is unlikely that Muawiya would benefit in any way by killing Hassan. Hassan proved to be no threat to his c aliphate and had no political involvement at all. Bec! ause of the lack of substantial evidence, it is unafraid to conclude that Hassan?s death was not connected to Muawiya?s personal motives against Ali. The same could be said for Husayn?s death; Muawiya had already passed absent and the focus has shifted to his son, Yazid I. Some weak sources claim that Muawiya had promised Husayn the Caliphate after his death.

Here, it can only be assumed that he cherished to keep the power in his family and the Umayyads, and it?s possible that there might still be some personal blood feud against Ali, thus he went back on his word and set up the summation of his son, Yazid I an d indirectly played a give out in Husayn?s death. Muawiya?s nomination of Yazid caused a stir in the Muslim community, those opposing the plan, quickly ? criminate Muawiya of attempting to set up a hereditary monarchy.? It also brought unaired speculation of Muawiya?s Islamic dedicate and its ideals. However, he in all likelihood realised the flaws of a democratic caliphate and sensed that a monarchy would be the best way forward for the Muslims, considering the fact that the Arabs supported the fancy during the issue of succession of the Prophet in the case of Ali. Armstrong though states that he ?de divide from Arab traditions in order to secure the succession.? Weiss and guanine rebuke this statement, believing that ?even in this matter Muawiya showed think of to Arab sensitivities. Rather than imposing the dynastic principle upon tribal leaders, he secured from them an oath of allegiance for his son, thus basing the succession upon their consent rather than upon an y legitimate right of his household.? The principle ! of succession by election was thereby honored, while the caliphate actually passed from father to son. Muawiya had institute a loophole though this system and consequently created a pseudo for a de facto dynasty. But considering Yazid?s character, ?an absolute playboy? , the spiritual quality of the caliph has taken a back fuck to the politics, therefore also reflecting Muawiya?s religious grounding and proves that his intentions were to keep the Umayyads in power. Muawiya?s actions throughout his career demonstrate that ?his virtues were those of the prideful politician, not of the brilliant general or the religious leader.? nearly historians, such as Kennedy, Armstrong, and Peterson etc. agree that Muawiya was problematic in religious context, stating that he is far from ideal and ? scrupulously suffering? . According to Humphreys, ?In formal piety and personal conduct, he was acceptable enough (at least he provoked no public scandal) but he was never regarded as re ligiously learned or even thoughtful and engaged, beyond a superficial level. He believed in God and was publicly coiffure in his observances but no more.? His lack of Islamic blueprint could be confirmed in his actions and decisions. Religiously unlawful activities and photograph methods of gaining power and status against Ali establish his disregard and failure to control to simple Islamic principles, ideals, the Quran and Hadith. In conclusion, although Muawiya was a number of the conflicts and anxieties that afflicted the Ummah, he is decisive political figure in the history of Islam. Muawiya was ?literally the only man with political and soldiery resources available to restore unity? , despite lacking a religious moral ground. Even though he restored peace, he had deliberately provoked and been a major protagonist in the civil war that disunited them in the first place. Whilst historical evidence on his personal thoughts and intentions are not solid, it is homely t hough that his ascension to caliph and power was ulti! mately part due to his own machinations. Bibliography:1.Armstrong, Karen, Islam: A Short muniment, Phoenix Press, London, 20022.Hawting, G. R., The note of hand of al-Tabari Volume XVII The First Civil War, New York Press, USA, 19963.Hitti, Phillip K., write up of the Arabs, Macmillan, New York, 20024.Humphreys, Stephen R., Muawiya ibn Abi Sufyan ? From Arabia to Empire, Oneworld Pubns Ltd, 20065.Kennedy, Hugh, The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates, Pearson Education Limited, Great Britain, 20046.Madelung, Wilferd, The victorious over to Muhammad ? A Study of early(a) Caliphate7.Petersen, Erling Ladewig, Ali and Muawiya in Early Arabic Tradition, Munksgaard, Copenhagen, 19648.Weiss, Bernard G. and Green, Arnold H., A Survey of Arab history, Cairo, Cairo Press, Amer. Univ., 1990 i mustiness say, this essay is very good overall. Has many sources to back up the author and also has l ooked at the situation from both sides. If you loss to get a full essay, order it on our website: BestEssayCheap.com

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